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CONDIT

AN ANALYSIS OF WHY CHINA’S GOVERNMENT
WILL EVENTUALLY REFORM THE HUKOU SYSTEM
JUSTIN CONDIT

INTRODUCTION
If the People’s Republic of China’s (“China”) hukou system is not reformed by the year
2020, approximately 600 million citizens will be living in Chinese cities facing economic, social,
and political discrimination.1 China’s hukou system segregates the citizens of China, based on
their mother’s family lineage, into two classes: citizens with urban hukou and citizens with rural
hukou.2 In 2010, approximately 261 million citizens had already migrated to urban areas in
search of better opportunities.3 However, the migrant workers are treated as second class
citizens as compared to the local urban hukou holders because they are denied basic public
services, are only eligible for the worst jobs, and are often discriminated against by the local
hukou holders in the cities.4
In November 2013, a report from the 3rd Plenary Session of the Communist Party’s 18 th
Central Committee (“the Third Plenum”), a noteworthy meeting of China’s top leaders in its
Communist Party, proposed accelerating the gradual reform of the hukou system.5 The plan is to

1 See JASON YOUNG, CHINA'S HUKOU SYST EM : M ARKET S, M IGRANT S AND INST IT UTIONAL CHANGE 3
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
2 See, e.g., Kam Wing Chan, The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a
Debate, Population & Dev. Rev., June 2010, at 357, 357 (describing the two classes of citizenship in China caused
by the hukou system); see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48 (explaining how hukou status is based off the mother’s
lineage).
3 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 1, at 3.
4 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 2, at 357 (describing how rural hukou holders are denied the same
opportunities as urban hukou holders).
5 See China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, GLOBAL TIMES.CN (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/825205.shtml#.Uy9bgvldWBL (detailing the proposed hukou reform from the
Third Plenum in 2013); see also Jane Golley, An End to China’s ‘Apartheid’?, EAST A SIAFORUM.ORG (Jan. 14,
2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/14/an-end-to-chinas-apartheid/; see also China’s New Reform
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fully open towns and small cities6 and to relax restrictions on settling in medium-sized cities in
an orderly manner.7 Additionally, reasonable requirements are to be set for rural residents to
obtain hukou in large cities, and megacities will continue to be strictly controlled. 8 Most
importantly, the report declared that an “effort should be made to make basic public services
available for all permanent residents in cities and include all rural residents into the affordable
housing system and the social security network.”9
Beginning with the Xia Dynasty in the 21st century BC, China’s government has used a
form of hukou system as an instrument to advance the government’s self-interests and to control
the people of China. Whether it was the Republican government using the hukou system to help
fend off the communist revolution or the Communist government using the hukou system to help
implement its planned economy, China’s government has utilized the hukou system to advance
its self-interests.10 If China’s government is going to implement the recently proposed hukou
reform, it must achieve more than protecting the human rights of migrant workers and improving
their standards of living; the proposed hukou reform must also advance the government’s selfinterests.
There are numerous reasons why the hukou system should be reformed, including the
protection of human rights and equality. However, this Article focuses on the reasons why the
hukou system will eventually be reformed, not the reasons why it should be reformed. China’s
government will only reform the hukou system if it advances its self-interests. This Article
Blueprint has Arrived, CHINA REAL TIME (Nov. 15, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/ 15/china-toease-one-child-policy-abolish-labor-camps/ (describing what the 3rd Plenary Session of the Communist Party’s 18th
Central Committee is); infra Part III.
6 See Golley, supra note 5 (detailing the plan for hukou reform in small and medium sized cities).
7 See China to Accelerate ‘Hukou’ System Reform, supra note 5.
8 See id.
9 Id.
10 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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argues that the Chinese government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will
advance its self-interests of urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and
domestic social stability.
Part I demonstrates the historical significance of the hukou system in China and how
China’s governments utilized the hukou system to advance its self-interests throughout history.
Part II describes the modern hukou system in China and focuses on how it affects the lives of
migrant workers. Part III discusses the most recent proposed reform to the hukou system.
Finally, Part IV explores how hukou reform will advance the self-interests of the Chinese
government, specifically urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and
domestic social stability.
I
THE HISTORY OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM
The history of China’s hukou system clearly demonstrates that it has regularly been
utilized as an instrument to advance the government’s self-interests and to control the people of
China.11 The Republican government fending off the communist revolution, the Communist
government establishing sovereignty along China’s borders, and the post-Mao government
supplying cheap labor for the new market economy are all great examples of the government
utilizing the hukou system to advance its self-interests. Why would the recent proposed reform
of the hukou system be any different? Understanding the history of the hukou system and
specifically, why China’s governments used the system in the past, reveals that for the recent
proposed reform to be achieved, it must advance the Chinese government’s self-interests.

11

See generally YOUNG, supra note 1 (providing a detailed outline of China’s hukou system throughout history).
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The development of the pre-modern hukou system,12 the utilization of the hukou system
during the Republican and Mao eras, and the reform of the hukou system after transforming to a
market economy in the late 1970s have all greatly influenced modern China and the current
hukou system. A form of the hukou system has been a part of China since the Xia Dynasty in the
21st century BC.13 Since hukou systems have been a feature of political, economic, and social
life in China for over 4000 years, it has “developed a high degree of historical legitimacy” and is
part of Chinese culture and tradition. 14 Reforming a system that has been a part of the way of
life in China for so long will be a challenging and monumental feat.
China’s pre-modern hukou system was an essential part of “the state building process, the
centralisation of power and authority and restrictions on migration and social mobility.”15 In the
21st century BC, the Xia Dynasty instituted the first form of the pre-modern hukou system for
social control and taxation purposes. 16 This earliest form of the pre-modern hukou system
included both a population census and a household registration. 17 As early as 770 BC, some
areas of China began to use the pre-modern hukou system to block internal migration, limiting
people to their registered living place. 18
During the Qin and Han Dynasties, from 221 BC to 220 AD, the pre-modern hukou
system developed into more of a legal institution, in which people found violating the system
were punished.19 If a person was found illegally migrating, in violation of the pre-modern hukou

12

Although it was not called a hukou system in the pre-modern era, the pre-modern Chinese institutions
were sufficiently similar, consisting of residence registrations and restrictions on mobility. For the purposes of this
Article, these similar pre-modern institutions will be referred to as the “pre-modern hukou system.”
13 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 29.
14 See id. at 28-29.
15 Id. at 27.
16 See id. at 29.
17 See id.
18 See id. at 30.
19 See YOUNG, supra note 1.
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system, he would bring punishment upon himself and his collective, the organized unit where he
was registered.20 The Qin Dynasty first began widely imposing harsh punishments for violating
the pre-modern hukou system, and the Han Dynasty continued developing the system by
introducing enforcement officials and identification permits.21 A person without a proper
identification permit was put in prison.22 The pre-modern hukou system, instituted by the Qin
and Han Dynasties, predominantly remained the system used throughout the remainder of
China’s pre-modern era.23
Although imperialism in China fell in 1911, the hukou system continued to be utilized
“by the Republican Government, warlords, Japanese forces, and the communist insurrection
alike.”24 The Republican Government used the hukou system to fend off the communists and to
raise funds to pay for the wars through imposing taxes. 25 Similarly, after the Communist Party
took control, the People’s Republic of China continued to use the hukou system for its selfinterests, despite initially repealing all of the Republic of China’s laws. 26
During the Mao era, the hukou system was used to manage the planned economy, control
migration, distribute state resources, and monitor targeted groups of people. 27 In the early 1950s,
at the beginning of China’s communist era, a large number of people from rural areas in China
migrated to the cities,28 which proved difficult for the newly formed Communist government to

20

See id. at 30-31.
See id. at 31.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 34.
25 See YOUNG supra note 1.
26 See id. at 35.
27 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM ’N ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGIST RAT ION SYST EM: SUST AINED
REFORM NEEDED T O PROT ECT CHINA’S RURAL M IGRANT S (2005) (explaining the hukou system used by China’s
Communist government from the 1950s to the 1970s); see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 35.
28 “China's urban population increased from 10.6 per cent of total population in 1949 to 14.6 percent in
1956, with a net gain of 34.6 million. Rural migrants accounted for 19.8 million of the total increase.” Tiejun Cheng
21
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manage while trying to implement its command economy and provide subsidies for the urban
population.29 In response, throughout the 1950s, China’s government instituted strict hukou
regulations to stop the rural to urban migration, finally culminating in the adoption of the
People’s Republic of China Hukou Registration Regulation30 in 1958.31 The rationale for the
Hukou Registration Regulation of 1958 was to maintain social order, be of service to the
establishment of socialism, and ironically, protect the rights and interests of citizens. 32 The
primary purpose of the regulation was to decrease rural migration to urban areas 33 by requiring
that all internal migration be subject to government approval.

34

As a consequence of the 1958

regulation, the citizens of China were divided into two very different classes: people with rural
hukou and people with urban hukou.35 Urban hukou holders were entitled to benefits–including
employment security, housing, pensions, education, and medical care–while rural hukou holders
were only entitled to access to farmland and some welfare. 36
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government used state planned migrations and
hukou transfers to advance its self-interests.37 The government commonly used state planned
border migration to establish land borders and sovereignty in certain areas, such as Tibet and

& Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System, THE CHINA QUART ERLY NO. 139,
Sep. 1994, at 644, 653. Strong mechanisms, such as the hukou system, were required to prevent a rural exodus. See
Chan, supra note 2, at 357.
29 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 36; see generally Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social
Consequences of China's Hukou System, THE CHINA QUART ERLY NO. 139, Sep. 1994, at 644 (detailing the origins
of the hukou system as used by China’s Communist government in the 1950s).
30 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 40 (providing a detailed summary of 1958 regulation).
31 See Chan, supra note 2, at 357-58.
32 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 39.
33 See id.
34 See Chan, supra note 2, at 358.
35 See, e.g., id. at 357.
36 See Shaohua Zhan, What Determines Migrant Workers’ Life Chances in Contemporary China? Hukou,
Social Exclusion, and the Market, M ODERN CHINA, Feb. 14, 2011, at 244, 252.
37 “The Mao era was characterized by political and politico-economic migrations sanctioned or imposed by
the state through transfer of hukou, showing a clear pattern of state use of the hukou system as an instrument of
political and command economy imperatives.” YOUNG, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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Inner Mongolia.38 For example, the government used a planned migration to the northern
frontiers in order to secure the Sino-Soviet border.39 Additionally, the government also used
state planned migrations for economic purposes. Highly skilled and educated workers were sent
to places that needed their skill set, college students were assigned to places to work after
graduation, and laborers were sent to areas in need of factory workers for temporary periods of
time.40 Furthermore, during the Mao era, the government used the hukou system to exile and
punish urban hukou holders by changing their registration to a rural area.41
In 1978, after the death of Mao Zedong, China’s government began economic reforms to
transform its command economy into more of an open market economy.42 Since the new market
economy needed low skilled laborers to grow, 43 the government began to incrementally relax the
strictly enforced hukou system to allow some rural hukou holders to migrate to the cities.44 The
Chinese government needed cheap labor for its new labor intensive, export oriented growth
strategy,45 so it targeted specific areas in China to dictate the migration, based on the demand for
workers.46 Additionally, the new market economy led to the abandonment of the rationing
system, eventually allowing rural hukou holders the ability to migrate without formal registration
and survive without relying on state subsidies.47 The reforms of the residence restrictions and
the new market economy allowed rural hukou holders to freely migrate; however, rural hukou
38

See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 45.
See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 46.
42 See BARRY NAUGHT ON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY 85 (The MIT Press, 2007).
43 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 27.
44 See Chan, supra note 2, at 358-359 (describing the relaxation of the strict hukou regulations restricting
during China’s transformation to a more market economy).
45 See id. at 357-58.
46 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 15.
47 Until the emergence of the market economy, a migrant worker without a local urban hukou could not
purchase food or find a place to live in the cities. The new market economy enabled rural workers to migrate to the
cities in search of employment opportunities because they now had access to urban goods and services. See Zhan,
supra note 36, at 253-53; see also CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 3.
39
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holders who migrated were still not able to receive the public services that urban hukou holders
were afforded.48 Since the relaxation of the strict limitations on the ability to migrate, reform
efforts have focused on treating the migrant workers equally compared to the local urban hukou
holders. Although the division between the rights of urban and rural hukou holders has been
reduced since the Mao era,49 the differences that remain still significantly affect the opportunities
and quality of life of the migrant workers under the current hukou system.50
II
THE M ODERN HUKOU SYSTEM
China’s hukou system is a household registration system which classifies citizens both by
location of permanent residence and status as either agricultural or non-agricultural residents.51
Chinese citizens’ hukou status and hukou location are determined through their mother’s family
lineage.52 Under this system, the people of China are divided into two vastly different classes of
citizenship: citizens with urban hukou and citizens with rural hukou.53 Approximately 700 to
800 million rural hukou holders are treated as second class citizens compared to urban hukou
holders.54 Because of the great disparity between rural and urban China, hundreds of millions of
rural migrant workers have migrated to cities in hopes of better opportunities. 55 In 2010, there

48
49

See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 3.
See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 42 (comparing the rights of urban and rural hukou holder during the Mao

era).
50

See id. at 48-50.
See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 2.
52 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48.
53 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 2, at 357; see also, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM ’N ON CHINA, FREEDOM OF
RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT (2010), available at http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2010-annualreport#Freedom of Residence and Movement [hereinafter FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT ].
54 See Chan, supra note 2, at 357.
55 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 1, at 48.
51
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were 261 million non-hukou workers56 in urban areas of China, and it is predicted that there will
be 300 to 400 million more within the next decade.57 Although approximately 261 million
migrant workers are now residents in the cities, they are still treated as second class citizens
compared to the local urban hukou holders because they face “de facto discrimination . . . in the
fields of employment, social security, health service, and education.”58
Migrant workers are denied access to the public goods and services that are afforded to
the local urban hukou holders because of their non-local hukou status.59 Most of them do not
receive health care insurance, pension or retirement benefits, unemployment compensation,
minimum living support, housing benefits, and publicly funded education to urban schools for
their children.60 The children of the migrant workers are often unable to attend the local public
schools in the cities where their parents work. 61 China’s law and regulations actually call for
equal treatment of children;

62

however, in practice, millions of migrant children are still

excluded from attending urban public schools. 63 Additionally, regulations allow charging
additional education fees for migrant children because of their hukou status.64 Migrant workers
are left with three options: (1) pay for their children to attend urban private schools, (2) pay an
expensive additional fee to gain access to urban public schools, or (3) send their children back to

In 2003, approximately eighty percent of China’s floating population was agricultural hukou or rural
hukou holders. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 50. The vast majority of the non-local hukou population in urban China
is comprised of rural migrant workers.
57 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 3 (predicting migration in China for the next decade).
58 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant on its 34 th Sess., at 3, Apr. 25-May13, 2005,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005).
59 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM ’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 7.
60 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 255; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58-60; see also FREEDOM OF
RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53.
61 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53.
62 “A 2003 State Council directive instructed local governments to make efforts toward providing education
for migrant children.” CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 7.
63 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM ’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 1.
64 See id. at 8.
56
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live with relatives65 and attend a rural school.66 The urban private schools, commonly referred to
as migrant schools, are relatively affordable for migrant workers, but they are substandard and
often unlicensed. These migrant schools “typically have poor teaching facilities, undeveloped
curricula, insufficient funding, and less qualified teachers.”67 Meanwhile, to gain access to the
better urban public schools, migrant workers are required to pay a significant additional fee,68
usually several thousand yuan per year. 69 Most migrant workers cannot afford to pay the
additional fee, and even if they could, migrant children are often not treated equally when
attending urban public schools.70 Furthermore, if migrant children want to attend high school or
take the entrance exam for college, they must return to their hukou locations.71
In addition to not receiving basic public goods and services, most rural migrant workers
are only able to get the worst jobs in the cities, 72 which “allow a bare minimum standard of

65

Approximately sixty one million Chinese children, one in every five, have not seen one or both of their
parents for at least three months because their migrant parents must leave them behind to find work in t he cities.
Many of the left-behind children are left with the responsibilities of running a household, raising younger siblings,
and caring for aging grandparents. Unfortunately, the left-behind children often suffer problems, such as anxiety,
depression, and sometimes even death. In 2012, five left-behind boys died from carbon-monoxide poisoning when
they lit a fire in a dumpster, attempting to shelter from the cold. See Andrew Browne, Left-Behind Children of
China’s Migrant Workers Bear Grown-Up Burdens, CHINA REAL TIME (Jan.17,2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579260900849637692 (an eye -opening portrayal
of children left-behind in China because their parents are migrant workers).
66 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59-60
(explaining the options that migrant workers have to educate their children).
67 THE W ORLD BANK & DEV. RESEARCH CT R. OF T HE ST ATE COUNCIL , CHINA, URBAN CHINA: TOWARD
EFFICIENT , INCLUSIVE , AND SUST AINABLE URBANIZATION 18 (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter THE W ORLD BANK]
(describing the condition of migrant schools in china).
68 In Beijing, rural migrant workers must pay an additional fee of 12,000 yuan per year in order for one
child to attend urban public schools. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59-60.
69 See CONG.-EXEC. COMM ’N ON CHINA, supra note 27, at 8.
70 In some urban public schools, the migrant children are completely segregated from the other children and
have separate teachers and textbooks. See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53.
71 See FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53; Depending on the location children take
the college entrance exam, different scores are required to be accepted into the best colleges. A rural hukou holder
must score much higher on the exam than a local urban hukou holder to be accepted at the best colleges in the cities.
See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 60.
72 Despite only being eligible for the worst jobs in the cities, most migrant workers can still earn far more in
the cities than at home. See id. at 51.
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living.”73 In many of the urban areas, there are local decrees that actually limit migrant workers
to obtaining jobs only in the low-end, so called “3-D,” category. Jobs in the so called “3-D”
category are dangerous, dirty, and demeaning.74 Additionally, migrant workers are easily
exploitable,75 and it is not uncommon for their working rights to be infringed. 76 China’s migrant
workers are owed billions in delayed salaries from employers, which in many cases they will
never receive.77 For example, in 2004, fifteen migrant workers were denied rightful wages from
their employer, a Jiangsu labor company. 78 After the fifteen migrant workers finished the
construction job they were contracted to complete, their boss refused to pay them for their work
and disappeared.79 With the help of the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers80
(“BLAOMW”) and its founder Tong Lihua,81 the fifteen migrant workers were able to receive

73 Chan, supra note 2, at 359 (describing the types of jobs that are usually available for migrant workers in
the Chinese cities).
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 Some examples of infringements on the working rights of migrant workers are the “denial of labour
contracts; forced overtime; denial of holidays; the use of fines by managers; unpaid wages; financial penalties and
the obstruction of the rights to leave employment; and grossly inadequate housing arrangements for workers.”
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 59.
77 See Tony Lihua - Fighting for the Rights of the Vulnerable, CRIENGLISH.COM (Mar. 2, 2007, 4:04 PM),
http://english.cri.cn/4406/2007/04/29/47@221807.ht m (providing a short biography of Tony Lihua).
78 See Fifteen Migrant Workers Denied Rightful Wages, BEIJING LEGAL A ID OFFICE FOR M IGRANT
W ORKERS (2009), https://sites.google.com/a/chinapilaw.org/blaomw/fifteen-migrant-workers-denied-rightful-wages
(describing one of the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers leading cases concerning the rights of fifteen
migrant workers).
79 See id.
80 The Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers (“BLAOMW”) is a non-profit organization that
provides full-time and professional legal aid to Chinese migrant workers. Since 2005, the BLAOMW has provided
legal services for more than 95,000 migrant workers and has represented over 5600 migrant workers in court. As of
March 2009, it has successfully received awards of over thirty four million yuan for migrant workers. See About Us,
BEIJING LEGAL A ID OFFICE FOR M IGRANT W ORKERS (2009), https://sites.google.com/a/chinapilaw.org/blaomw/
about-us.
81 Tong Lihua, the 2012 International Bar Association Pro Bono Award winner, was one of the first
professional public interest lawyers in China and founded the Beijing Children’s Rights Legal Aid and Research
Centre in 1999 and the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers in 2005. He has devoted his legal career to
helping the children and migrant workers of China through providing free legal services. See International Bar
Association, Tony Lihua 2012 IBA Pro Bono Award Winner, IBA NET .ORG (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=ff0446c9 f-b 3dd-4698-a4c7-8fee975e22e7 (honoring the
selfless and inspiring legal career of Tony Lihua).
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favorable judgments against their employer in court. 82 Despite the incredible work of the
BLAOMW, many of China’s migrant workers are exploited by their employers and lack access
to legal aid.83 Migrant workers are only eligible for the low-end jobs in the cities and in addition,
are often exploited by their employers.
The migrant workers also face discrimination from the local urban hukou holders. Since
they are not equal under the laws of China, the local urban hukou holders often look down upon
and sometimes exploit the migrant workers.84 A rural migrant worker is discriminated against
for being a waidiren, a non-local resident, and for being a nongmin, a peasant, or a xiangxiaren, a
rural person.85 Even after thirty years of constant migration, many of the migrant workers still
face the brunt of stereotyping and discrimination because they are poor and less educated.86
During an interview in 2005, Li Min, a migrant worker in Beijing, proclaimed, “People from
Beijing think they’re the real locals, so no matter what, they’re superior to you. They never think
about what class they belong to; they only have one way of seeing things: I’m a Beijing local and
I’m better than you.”87 In a 1996 survey,88 sixty three percent of migrant workers experienced
discrimination from local urban residents. 89 “[P]rovinciality and rural roots can be an
insurmountable barrier to acceptance and equal treatment in the cities by local urbanites."90

82

See Fifteen Migrant Workers Denied Rightful Wages, supra note 78.
See Tony Lihua - Fighting for the Rights of the Vulnerable, supra note 77.
84 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 264; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58.
85 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 261 (describing the discriminatory language used to refer to migrant
workers).
86 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58.
87 Zhan, supra note 36, at 264.
88 The survey of migrant workers was conducted in four large cities, including Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Wuhan. See Zhan, supra note 36, at 260.
89 See id.
90 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58.
83
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The story of Bai Lin, a nineteen year old girl with a rural hukou, portrays the daunting
reality of life for many of the approximate 261 million migrant workers in China.91 Bai Lin grew
up in a dirt-floored hovel in Two Dragons, a small village in central China.92 Her family has
struggled to survive as farmers in Two Dragons for the last eight generations.93 At fifteen years
old, Bai’s father told her that she must leave home to search for work in the city because their
family was too poor to survive.94 Bai Lins’s father was forced to take his fifteen year old
daughter to the bus station and send her to Changshu, a city of a million people. 95 Four years
later, Bai Lin is still working as a factory drone at Changshu Medical Instrument, a factory that
produces medical supplies.96 Bai Lin works twelve hours a day, seven days a week, cutting and
stacking pieces of rubber tubes that eventually become IV drips for hospitals in Switzerland and
France.97 Each day, Bai Lin essentially goes straight from work to the factory dormitory, “a
squalid line of concrete rooms that look like connected sheds.”98 The only time she leaves the
factory compound is when she returns home for the Chinese New Year holiday.99 Before leaving
for the holiday, Bai Lin receives her entire yearly salary in a one lump sum payment of $500,
which she gives entirely to her family. 100 Bai Lin earns approximately $1.50 a day or around 12
cents an hour. To make matters worse, she is trapped into working for the entire year because if

91

See Michael A. Lev, Part 2 of 3: The Factory Nuns of Urban China, CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM (Dec. 27,
2004), http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-chinapart2-story,0,1439341.story [hereinafter Part 2 of 3: The Factory
Nuns of Urban China] (portraying Bai Lin’s story of migrating from rural to urban China).
92 See Michael A. Lev, Part 1 of 3: Migration of a Nation, CHICAGOTRIBUNE .COM (Dec. 26, 2004),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-0412260374dec26,0,5421512.story [hereinafter Part 1 of 3: Migration of a
Nation] (describing the Bai family from Two Dragons, China).
93 See id.
94 See Part 2 of 3: The Factory Nuns of Urban China, supra note 91.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 Id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
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she leaves before the pay-day, she will likely never receive any wages for her work. 101 Every
year, after the Chinese New Year holiday, Bai Lin desires to stay home, but she knows that she
must return to the city to help support her family. 102 This is the life of a migrant worker in
China.
III
THE RECENT PROPOSED REFORM OF THE HUKOU SYSTEM
Hukou reform has been a polarizing topic of conversation amongst the leaders of China’s
government, the media, and academics.103 In December 2009, China’s Central Economic Work
Conference suggested initiatives to reform the hukou system in small and medium sized cities as
a way to increase domestic consumption. 104 Increasing consumption in China will help
rebalance its increasingly instable economy.105 Shortly after the well-publicized Central
Economic Work Conference, then Premier Wen Jiabao announced “that China will steadily
advance the reform of its decades-long household registration system in order to ensure migrant
workers have the same rights as city dwellers.”106 Additionally, in January 2010, the Chinese
Communist Party’s No. 1 Central Committee Document also proposed hukou reform, similar to
the initiative that was initially suggested by the Central Economic Work Conference. 107 The
Central Committee Document proposed that “rural migrant workers should be allowed to settle

101

See id.
See id.
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permanently in small and medium sized cities and enjoy the same public facilities and services as
those with local urban hukou.”108
Although China’s government was comfortable discussing hukou reform in 2010, it was
not comfortable with the media demanding hukou reform.109 On March 1, 2010, the day before
China’s National People’s Congress’s annual meeting, an identical article appealing “to the
authorities to accelerate hukou reform and ultimately to abolish the system” appeared in thirteen
big-city newspapers from eleven different provinces.110 The article urged for the government “to
devise a clear timetable for nationwide hukou reform” and that “the rigid hukou system should be
gradually replaced by a population information registration system, and eventually be
eliminated.”111 Furthermore, the article justified the appeal for abolishing the hukou system by
declaring that it breeds corruption and violates human rights and personal freedom of China’s
constitution.112 The moving appeal for reform of the hukou system concluded by profoundly
encouraging:
We hope that our millions and millions of countrymen, whether from the north or south,
[whether they] live in the city or countryside, will all have the same employment
opportunities, health care, pension, education, and migration rights. We hope the rigid
hukou system will end with our generation, and that the next generation will enjoy
genuine freedom, democracy, and equality—the sacred rights enshrined in the
Constitution!113
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In response, China’s government quickly censored the article by removing it from websites and
internet portals within a few hours, and Zhang Hong, the main drafter of the article and deputy
editor of the Economic Observer, was ousted from his employment position. 114
On June 26, 2013, in a report on urbanization, China’s National Development and
Reform Commission announced that “the government should gradually tear down household
registration obstacles to facilitate the orderly migration of people from rural to urban areas.”115
Additionally, a report of the Third Plenum reaffirmed China’s commitment to accelerating the
gradual reform of the hukou system by 2020, as part of its urbanization strategy. 116 The report
categorized cities as either towns and small cities, medium-sized cities, large cities, or
megacities.117 It stated that the plan is to fully open towns and small cities 118 and to relax
restrictions on settling in medium-sized cities in an orderly manner. 119 The report is much more
conservative with regards to large cities and megacities. Reasonable requirements are to be set
for rural residents to obtain hukou in large cities, and megacities will continue to be strictly
controlled.120 Most importantly, the report declared that an “effort should be made to make basic
public services available for all permanent residents in cities and include all rural residents into
the affordable housing system and the social security network.”121 The goal is to gradually
extend these services through both local government and central government funding. 122
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http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-28/china-moves-on-reforming-hukou.
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Recently, the Ministry of Public Security and 11 other ministries and commissions
drafted guidelines for the hukou reform, which would aim to have a new hukou system
established by 2020.123 If the guidelines for reform are achieved, a person’s hukou status will be
determined by his place of residence and employment, rather than the birthplace of his mother’s
lineage.124 Additionally, Huang Ming, the vice-minister of public security, explained that “the
new hukou system will gradually extend pension, education and, health care services to qualified
residents, both urban and rural.”125
IV
WHY CHINA’S GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY REFORM THE HUKOU SYSTEM
Despite the encouraging proposed reform, there is no guarantee that China’s government
will follow through with reforming the hukou system. Numerous reasons exist why the hukou
system should be reformed, such as the human rights and equality of migrant workers; however,
hukou reform will only occur if it advances the Chinese government’s self-interests. China’s
government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will advance its self-interests of
urbanization, a balanced economy, international legitimacy, and domestic social stability.
URBANIZATION
For the past three decades, China has experienced exceptional economic growth, 126 in
part, because the “rapid economic development was facilitated by urbanization. ”127 During

123 See An Baijie, Hukou Reforms Target 2020: Official, XINUANET .COM (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:41 AM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/18/c_132976523.ht m.
124 See Baijie, supra note 123; see also Golley, supra note 5.
125 Baijie, supra note 123.
126 China has averaged growth of ten percent a year over the past three decades. See THE W ORLD BANK,
supra note 67, at xiii.
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China’s period of rapid economic growth, from 1978 to 2012, the urban population increased
from twenty percent to fifty two percent of the total population. 128 By 2030, China’s urban
population is expected to increase to seventy percent of the total population, some one billion
people.129 Although China’s urbanization in absolute numbers is massive, “the increase in its
urbanization rate has not been exceptional by international comparison.”130 Barriers to
migration, such as the hukou system, keep China’s urbanization rate too low and consequently,
underutilize productivity and exacerbate the urban-rural inequality gap.131
Urbanization is vital for a developing country, such as China, because it increases
productivity and promotes innovation.132 This explains why future urbanization is exceptionally
important to the Chinese government. Productivity and innovation increase because urbanization
provides agglomeration effects, including more efficient labor markets, lower transaction costs,
and knowledge spill-over between industries.133 Even smaller cities will experience
agglomeration effects from urbanization, as long as there is both “sufficient specialization and
transport linkages to larger urban areas.”134
China’s future urbanization is one of the government’s top priorities, 135 as indicated by
Premier Li Keqiang when he “promoted urbanization as both the next driver of economic growth
and a tool for addressing the gaping divide in income and quality of life between rural Chinese
127 Urbanization provided “a supportive environment for growth with abundant labor, cheap land, and good
infrastructure.” Id. at 3.
128 See id. at 5.
129 See id. at 3.
130 Id. at 5 (China’s urbanization rate has been lower than the urbanization rates of Japan and the Repu blic
of Korea at similar stages of development).
131 See id. at xiii.
132 See id. at 8.
133 See NAUGHT ON, supra note 42, at 126; see also YASHENG HUANG, URBANIZAT ION, HUKOU SYSTEM AND
GOVERNMENT LAND OWNERSHIP : EFFECT S ON RURAL M IGRANT W ORKERS AND RURAL AND URBAN HUKOU
RESIDENT S 18 (OECD Development Center, 2010); see also THE W ORLD BANK, supra note 67, at 7.
134 THE W ORLD BANK, supra note 67, at 7.
135 See id. at vii.
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and urbanites.”136 China’s proposed gradual reform of the hukou system is a part of its greater
urbanization strategy to encourage more people to migrate to cities where they can earn and
spend more money.137 Recently, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also promoted that, “China will
wage war against poverty with a stronger resolve.”138 In 2012, China’s own officials estimated
that 98.99 million139 rural poor are living below the national poverty line or $1.8 a day. 140
China’s economy disproportionately benefits its citizens living in urban areas, while citizens in
rural areas suffer, creating a substantial urban-rural divide.141 China plans to fight this “war on
poverty” through urbanization, transferring more of its rural population to urban population.142
The urbanization plan is to increase the income of the rural migrants, narrowing China’s
unusually large urban-rural income gap.143 Migrant workers’ wages are rising rapidly in China,
and many rural workers are able to earn higher incomes if they decide to migrate. 144 Increasing
the mobility of workers in China by reforming the hukou system will increase their wages.145
Additionally, an increase in migration will reduce the labor surplus in the rural areas of China,
increasing rural wages compared to urban wages. 146 Hukou reform will increase the mobility of
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migrant workers in China and reduce urban-rural inequality by increasing both the wages of
migrant workers and rural workers. 147
China’s urbanization strategy is to promote urbanization to less populated towns and
small cities.148 “China’s urbanization process is a result of a large increase of the number of
cities rather than a result of increasing the size of existing cities.”149 China’s urban population
continues to grow, however the population of Chinese cities has remained constant over time. 150
This type of urbanization attempts to make it more attractive for migrant workers to move to
low-density population or developing urban areas, rather than overcrowding the large cities and
metropolises.151 China’s government “effectively guides rural to urban migration to targeted
areas”152 by reforming the hukou system in those specific areas, making it less restrictive. 153
Reforming the hukou system will increase urbanization and migration in China. Rural
hukou holders in China decide to migrate to the cities in search of better opportunities. 154 The
decision to migrate is driven by the income differential between rural and urban China because
migrants are searching for higher income.155 Rural hukou holders are more likely to migrate to
cities when there is a large gap between the opportunities existing in rural and urban China.
China has an unusually large urban-rural inequality gap.156 In 2005, the per capita income of the

“Evidence from Korea also shows that free rural-urban migration reduced inequality. By 1994, three
decades into reform, Korea’s urban-rural wage gap had disappeared entirely—indicating that workers had migrated
to their optimal locations.” Id. at 16-17.
148 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 61.
149 HUANG, supra note 133, at 13.
150 See id.
151 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 61.
152 Id. at 62.
153 See id. at 61.
154 See NAUGHT ON, supra note 42, at 199.
155 See id.
156 In 2001, China’s Gini coefficient, a summary measure of income distribution, increased to 0.447,
showing that China is significantly more unequal than most developing Asian countries and about as unequal as the
average low-income country. See id. at 218.
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urban resident was over three times higher than that of a rural resident. 157 Rural migrant workers
significantly improve their income from moving to urban areas in China. 158 A survey of rural
migrant workers in urban areas of Guangdong159 showed that their average household income in
the cities was 31,195 yuan in 2008, while the average household income in their hukou location
was only 8277 yuan.160 The 2008 survey determined that, on average, rural migrant workers
increased their household income 22,918 yuan per year by migrating to the cities in Guangdong
province.161 There is a considerable amount of economic motivation for rural hukou holders to
migrate to the cities, and as a result, urbanization will continue in China. 162 However, despite the
economic motivation to migrate, China “is still less urbanized than expected at its level of
income” because of administrative barriers of mobility, such as the hukou system.163 Access to
the same public goods and services as the local urban hukou holders, will provide additional
motivation for rural hukou holders to migrate. Additionally, since the proposed reform is
gradual, it will allow China’s government to continue to guide the migration to targeted areas,
such as towns and small cities.
Hukou reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest to accelerate
urbanization because it will reduce barriers of mobility and provide more motivation to migrate.
Accelerating urbanization will increase productivity and promote innovation because of
agglomeration effects. Every 1% more of rural to urban migration, would yield a projected 1.2%
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more gross domestic product (“GDP”). 164 Additionally, urbanization will narrow the urban-rural
inequality gap. Migrant workers will earn higher incomes in the cities, and rural workers will
earn higher incomes when the increase in migration reduces the labor surplus in rural areas.
Hukou reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest in increasing urbanization.
REBALANCE THE ECONOMY
Rebalancing the economy by increasing the consumption share of GDP is a great concern
of the Chinese government. At a press conference following the annual meeting of the National
People’s Conference in March 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao declared, “China’s economic growth is
unsteady, imbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”165 Then, in 2011, Premier Wen Jiabao
again voiced his concerns about the need to rebalance the economy and increase consumption
when he stated, “If businesses go bankrupt, workers become unemployed and rural migrants go
home, then what do we have to expand domestic consumption, where will increased
consumption come from?”166 Additionally, on July 1, 2011, similar concerns were expressed by
Hu Jintao during his address on the 90th anniversary of the founding of China’s Communist
Party. Although China’s economy continues to experience exceptional growth,167 the economy
also continues to become increasingly imbalanced.168 In order to ensure that China’s economic
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growth remains sustainable in the long term, China must correct the imbalance by increasing
consumption.169
The three basic components of GDP are consumption, investment, and net exports of
goods and services.170 China’s investment and exports have continued to grow while
consumption has lagged behind, accounting for a smaller share of GDP.171 From 2003 to 2010,
investment “accounted for 53 percent of China’s economic growth, an exceptionally high share
by international standards.”172 Additionally, the growth of net exports of goods and services
became a major source of economic growth for China from 2005 to 2008. 173 In 2004, China’s
net exports of goods and services amounted to $40 billion or 2.5% of GDP.174 By 2007, China’s
net exports of goods and services had more than quadrupled, reaching $235 billion or 8.8% of
GDP.175 While investment and the net exports of goods and services have seen significant
growth, China’s consumption share of GDP has steadily decreased.176 Throughout the 1980s,
household consumption was, on average, slightly more than half of China’s GDP. 177 In the
1990s, household consumption dropped marginally to an average of just under half of China’s
GDP.178 However, beginning in 2003, household consumption decreased considerably,
accounting for only thirty five percent of GDP in 2008 and 2009.179 China’s household
consumption share of only thirty five percent is substantially lower than any other major
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economy in the world.180 China’s extraordinary low share of household consumption in GDP
has caused its economy to become imbalanced, relying too heavily on investments and net
exports.181
Despite China experiencing rapid urbanization since the 1990s and migrant workers
significantly improving their income, 182 China’s consumption share of GDP continues to
decrease causing the economy to be increasingly imbalanced. 183 Migrant workers have a strong
precautionary savings motivation because they do not have access to the same basic public
services received by local urban hukou holders.184 As a result, migrant workers have a
substantially higher savings rate than China’s national average. 185 In 2007, local urban hukou
holders in Guangzhou had an average household savings rate of 15.6 percent, while the average
household savings rate for rural migrant workers in Guangzhou was 41 percent. 186 Since migrant
workers save at much higher rate than the local urban hukou holders, their consumption does not
increase with their increase in income from migrating.187
One option to rebalance China’s economy is to increase government consumption
expenditures, such as outlays for health, education, welfare and pensions. 188 Increasing
government consumption expenditures will increase both government consumption and
household consumption.189 Increasing government outlays for health, education, welfare, and
pensions will reduce the migrant workers need for precautionary savings, and as a result, the
“[T]ypical consumption shares in developed and emerging-market economies are reflected in the 63
percent consumption share in the United Kingdom and the 56 percent share in India, both in 2007.” Id. at 51.
181 See id.
182 Supra Part IV: Urbanization.
183 See HUANG, supra note 133, at 5; see also LARDY, supra note 165, at 45.
184 See HUANG, supra note 133, at 24.
185 See id. at 11.
186 See id. at 24.
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189 See id. at 69.
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migrant workers will have more disposable income and will be able to spend more, increasing
household consumption.190 Reforming the hukou system to provide migrant workers with basic
public services will increase government consumption expenditures and increase the household
consumption of migrant workers by reducing their need for precautionary savings.
There are approximately 261 million migrant workers in China191 who are denied access
to basic public services–such as health care insurance, pensions, unemployment benefits, and
urban public education–because of the hukou system.192 Since most migrant workers are trapped
working low-end jobs and receive no public services from the government, they often face bare
minimum living standards.193 If they have any money left after purchasing the necessities to
live, most migrant workers need to save their money in case they become unemployed, need to
pay for any unexpected medical expenses, or have to send their children to school in the city. If
China reformed the hukou system allowing migrant workers to receive public services, they will
not be motivated to save as much and will have more disposable income. Hukou reform will
reduce precautionary savings for migrant workers, and their household consumption will likely
increase. Consequently, hukou reform will also increase government consumption because the
government will be spending more by providing basic public services to the migrant workers.
An increase in both household consumption of the migrant workers and government
consumption will increase China’s extremely low consumption share of GDP. Hukou reform
will advance the Chinese government’s self-interest of rebalancing the economy, which is
imperative for China to sustain long term economic growth.
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INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY
China desires to be a “responsible great power” in the international community and to be
“accepted as a key global actor that is a force for peace and stability.”194 In fact, Chinese leaders
have not hesitated to declare China as a “responsible great power.”195 In 2014, China’s foreign
minister, Wang Yi, stated that “China will give full play to the country’s role as a responsible
world power.”196 Since the mid-1990s, China has become increasingly involved in the
international community by participating more in international organizations197 and multilateral
treaties.198 As China developed into a global economy, the Chinese government realized that it
has a growing interest in global stability because instability abroad affects China. 199 China will
continue to increase its role in the international community as a “responsible great power.”200
Before his first visits to Russian and Africa, China’s Premier Xi Jinping declared that “as
[China’s] strength increases, it will assume more international responsibilities.”201

194 SHAUN BRESLIN, CHINA’S EMERGING GLOBAL ROLE : DISSAT ISFIED RESPONSIBLE GREAT POWER, THE
UNIVERSIT Y OF W ARWICK (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9-10), available at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap.
195 See TIANG BOON HOO, A RESPONSIBLE GREAT POWER: THE A NAT OMY OF CHINA'S PROCLAIMED
IDENT ITY (University of Oxford, 2013), available at http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5db537a8-f62e-430f-a4d629baf626f6b0.
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If China wants to be considered a “responsible great power,” it must improve its domestic
human rights policies and cannot continue to violate international legal standards. 202 “Domestic
behavior and international credibility cannot be readily separated or neatly quarantined one from
the other. It will be difficult for Beijing to be accepted as a responsible stakeholder . . . as long
as political and civil freedoms are severely restricted in China.”203 Reforming the hukou system
will improve human rights in China and allow China to comply with international legal
standards.
China’s hukou system violates human rights and international treaties, specifically the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (“ICESCR”), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,204 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1996 (“ICCPR”).205 As of March 27, 2001, China has both signed and ratified the
ICESCR.206 China’s hukou system violates article two of the ICESR–“declaring that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind”

207 –

because it discriminates against migrant workers on the basis of their hukou status.208 China’s
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hukou system discriminates against migrant workers’ rights to freely choose work,209 social
security,210 and an adequate standard of living211 protected under the ICESCR.212 The hukou
system discriminates between migrant workers’ and local urban hukou holders’ rights to freely
choose work because migrant workers are often limited to working only the worst jobs in the
city, while urban hukou holders have access to the higher paying jobs. 213 Additionally, since
migrant workers are limited to the worst jobs, they often are subjected to bare minimum
standards of living because of their hukou status.214 The hukou system also discriminates against
migrant workers’ right to social security because it denies them access to health care insurance,
pension or retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, and
housing benefits.215
In addition to violating the ICESCR, China’s hukou system also violates the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. China is a Security Council member of the United
Nations–the international organization responsible for the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights–and has signed, but not yet ratified, the ICCPR. 216 Both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ICCPR protect the rights to freedom of movement and residence within

“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of
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RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53; see also supra Part II.
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the territory of each country.217 Although China’s hukou system does not strictly control
mobility anymore, it still sufficiently restricts the rights to freedom of movement and residence
because of the great discrimination citizens face if they migrate from their hukou location.
Hukou reform will further China’s goal of being accepted as a “great responsible power”
in the international community. China will gain international legitimacy by reforming the hukou
system because it will improve human rights in China. Furthermore, China will gain
international legitimacy because it will no longer violate the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because of the hukou system. The Chinese
government’s self-interests of gaining international legitimacy and becoming a “great
responsible power” will be advanced by hukou reform.
DOMESTIC SOCIAL STABILITY
China’s domestic social stability and the increasing social unrest is a very serious concern
of the Chinese government.218 China’s leaders often candidly publicize their concerns about the
importance to maintain domestic social stability. 219 In 2005, a Chinese government official from
the Ministry of Public Security declared that “it should be observed that China’s current overall
level of stability has been achieved within a high-pressure environment of unceasing, tough

217

See THE UNIT ED NAT IONS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARAT ION OF HUMAN RIGHT S (1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml; see also OFFICE OF T HE HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHT S,
INT ERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGT HS (1966), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
218 See CARL M INZER, SOCIAL INST ABILITY IN CHINA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS (Center
for Strategic & International Studies, 2005), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/061205_mizner_
abstract.pdf.
219 See JOHN KNIGHT , THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL INST ABILIT Y IN CHINA 2
(University of Oxford, 2012) (claiming that the term “social instability” appeared approximately “700-800 times a
year over the previous decade in the People’s Daily, a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece”); see also
Buckley & Wills, supra note 166.

29

CONDIT
public security measures [yanda], and that the foundation of social order is relatively fragile.” 220
Also, in 2005, the “Central Party Committee and State Council leaders issued an internal
directive that made reducing the level of social unrest a major policy goal.”221 Despite this
concern, the number of “mass incidents,”222 continues to drastically increase in China. 223 The
number of incidents has increased from 87,000 in 2005 to more than 280,000 in 2009. 224
Additionally, according to the Ministry of Finance, China’s local and national governments’
expenses for public security also continue to increase. 225 China’s governments spent
approximately 405 billion yuan in 2008 and 624 billion yuan in 2011 for public security.226 The
yearly increases in “mass incidents” and government expenditure for public security indicate that
domestic social stability is a mounting concern of the Chinese government.
Domestic social instability could potentially be a threat to both political order and the
economy in China.227 In order to pose a serious threat, the social instability would need to be
better coordinated and more widespread because generally, protests are uncoordinated and
involve only local issues.228 However, social instability could threaten political order and the
economy if a protest, similar to the Tiananmen Square incident,229 occurred.
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1990, before returning to its normal high rate in 1991.231 Large protests continue to occur in
China. For instance, in April 2014, 30,000 factory employees–mostly migrant workers–went on
strike outside of their work complex, where Nike and Adidas shoes are manufactured.232 The
protest over unfair pay and benefits has been ongoing for almost two weeks, and in response,
Chinese authorities have deployed riot police to maintain order. 233 Despite social instability
increasing in China, there has not been an organized protest as significant as the Tiananmen
Square incident.
Domestic social instability in China is caused by the Chinese citizens’ discontent with
issues concerning “the ongoing economic transitions, weak legal protections for citizen rights,
and a limited social security net for the poor and disadvantaged.” 234 Income, inequality, and
insecurity are some of the economic sources of social instability and are also some of the major
problems of migrant workers in China.235 Additionally, the increasing social discontent of
migrant workers is evident by the increase in mass labor disputes concerning low wages, unpaid
back wages, and inadequate retirement benefits. 236 In 1994, 52,637 workers were involved in
such disputes, compared to the 515,000 workers in 2003. 237 Migrant workers potentially pose a
threat to China’s domestic social stability.
Chinese citizens earning low incomes with little chance for economic growth are more
likely to be unhappy and dissatisfied with life and therefore, also more likely to be socially
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discontent.238 Migrant workers are usually limited to the lowest paying jobs in the cities and
often restrained from upward economic mobility because of discrimination from their hukou
status. Thus, migrant workers with low incomes are more likely to be socially discontent than
the more fortunate local urban hukou holders. Migrant workers with more social discontent are
more likely to threaten domestic social stability. 239
Inequality is another source of social instability.240 As discussed previously, one of
China’s main problems is its extremely large urban-rural inequality gap.241 Chinese citizens are
generally adverse to “inequality based on unfairness in access to opportunities.”242 However,
economic inequality in regards to social discontent is a more localized issue 243 because people
compare their economic situations to local reference groups. 244 Chinese citizens, who perceive
themselves as economically unequal within their reference groups because of unfair access to
opportunities, are more likely to be unhappy and dissatisfied. 245 Therefore, these Chinese
citizens are also more likely to be socially discontent. 246 The hukou system limits the migrant
workers’ access to opportunities, which is the exact type of inequality that upsets Chinese
citizens.

Additionally, migrant workers are most affected by perceived economic inequality

because they face economic and social discrimination from their hukou status, and their reference
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groups are people living in the cities, including the more fortunate local urban hukou holders.247
“[The hukou] problem has exacerbated economic inequality, a phenomenon that, if left untreated,
threatens China’s social stability.”248
The lack of a social safety net or economic insecurity also threatens domestic social
stability in China.249 Chinese citizens’ life satisfaction correlates with their economic security. 250
“The low point in life satisfaction matches the high point in unemployment and in people’s sense
of insecurity.”251

Migrant workers are economically insecure because they lack access to a

social safety net. Migrant workers are denied access to receive health care insurance, pension or
retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, housing benefits,
and publicly funded education to urban schools for their children because of the hukou system.252
The lack of a social safety net for migrant workers increases the threat to domestic social
stability.
Weak legal protections for citizens’ rights in China cause domestic social instability. 253
Labor disputes, which primarily involve the rights of migrant workers, are becoming “more
likely to have an impact on public opinion and social stability.”254 The rise in labor disputes in
China can be linked “not only to prevailing low wages, but also to failure of government
supervisory institutions to enforce relevant regulations and to the absence of independent unions

“The inequality of opportunity due to migrant status is a potent source of social instability.” KNIGHT ,
supra note 219, at 8-9.
248 Matt Schiavenza, A Chinese President Consolidates His Power, THE A T LANTIC (2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/11/a-chinese-president-consolidates-his-power/281547/.
249 See, e.g., Ren, supra note 240.
250 See KNIGHT , supra note 219, at 11.
251 Id.
252 See Zhan, supra note 36, at 255; see also YOUNG, supra note 1, at 58-60; see also FREEDOM OF
RESIDENCE AND M OVEMENT , supra note 53; see also supra Part II.
253 See M INZER, supra note 218.
254 THE W ORLD BANK, supra note 67, at 17.
247

33

CONDIT
to safeguard worker rights.”255 Migrant workers’ rights are easily exploitable because many of
them lack access to legal protection. 256 Migrant workers’ rights are extremely under protected
and cause domestic social instability.
Reforming the hukou system will advance China’s government’s self-interest of domestic
social stability. Hukou reform will allow migrant workers to receive equal access to
opportunities, and as a result, migrant workers’ general perception of inequality will diminish.
Also, hukou reform will allow migrant workers to receive health care insurance, pension or
retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, minimum living support, housing benefits,
and publicly funded education to urban schools for their children, so they will be more
economically secure and actually have some form of a social safety net. 257 Additionally, migrant
workers will only become eligible for higher paying jobs and will no longer be as easily
exploitable until after the hukou system is reformed. Hukou reform will lower the threat of
domestic social instability because it will reduce the inequality between migrant workers and
local urban hukou holders, provide migrant workers with a social safety net, and eventually,
increase their incomes and legal protections.
CONCLUSION
China’s hukou system must be reformed. If it is not reformed by the year 2020,
approximately 600 million citizens will be living in Chinese cities facing economic, social, and
political discrimination.258 However, China’s government will only reform the hukou system if
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it advances its self-interests. The hukou system limits urbanization, increases the imbalance in
the economy, diminishes international legitimacy, and causes domestic social instability. Hukou
reform will advance the Chinese government’s self-interests of accelerating urbanization,
rebalancing the economy, gaining international legitimacy, and securing domestic social
stability. China’s government will eventually reform the hukou system because it will advance
these self-interests.
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